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PUNISHING COLLECTIVE ENTITIES
Tom R. Tyler and Avital Mentovich
INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that, while the legal world treats corporate
entities as “people” for legal purposes, this legal framing does not
fit well with naïve models of assessing responsibility and blame.
These difficulties raise questions about the value of treating
entities as “people” for legal purposes just at a time when the
United States Supreme Court seems to be moving actively to
increase this “entity as a person” legal metaphor.
The Article first reviews the literature on the psychology of
responsibility and then presents both survey and experimental data
that compares reactions to individual and organizational level
wrongdoing. We argue that the data suggests that people have
greater trouble holding entities responsible for wrongdoing and
punishing them than they do making judgments of responsibility
and endorsing punitive actions for individuals. In an era of
corporate scandal and wrongdoing, this difficulty points to a
problem within the law—the process of punishing corporate
misconduct is more problematic than the process of punishing
individual misconduct.
I. THE LEGAL CATEGORIZATION OF ENTITIES AS INDIVIDUALS
It is common for the law to talk about corporate entities as if
they were people that have their own will, intentions, and goals.
 Tom Tyler is a University Professor at New York University who teaches in
the Psychology Department and the Law School.
 Avital Mentovich is a graduate of Tel Aviv University law school and
currently a graduate student in the Psychology Department at New York
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This legal personification of corporations began in the middle of
the nineteenth century. In the initial decisions, the view of the
corporation as a separate legal entity was developed mainly to limit
the personal liability of stockholders and to enable the signing of
contracts. The first ruling that effectively established the legal
fiction of corporate personhood is the 1886 United States Supreme
Court opinion, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad
Company.1 In that decision, there was no discussion of
corporations as juristic persons, and yet, because a court reporter
chose such language in writing the head note to the case, the
decision is now viewed as having granted corporations
constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment (the
amendment was originally enacted to secure due process and other
constitutional rights to newly released slaves).
In the decades following Santa Clara County, the Supreme
Court continued to develop the notion that corporations enjoy the
same protections as natural persons with very few exceptions.
Recently, the corporate personhood doctrine captured public
attention due to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission.2 In the landmark decision, the Court
held that the First Amendment did not limit the right of
corporations to actively participate in political campaigns by
funding independent political broadcasts.3 As in the prior case
noted, this decision invokes the idea of the corporation with the
rights of a person.
Legal scholars have noted that the equation of personhood and
corporate identity that is reflected in treating entities as if they
were individuals fits well with the prevailing legal rules, which
were organized around person-level categories governing
individual activity.4 It was difficult to insert a collectivity into a set
of laws with person-based rules and conceptions.5
As we move into an era of corporate scandal and corruption,

1

Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 394–96 (1886).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
3
Id.
4
VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY & CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY 82 (2000).
5
Id.
2
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discussions about the accountability of corporations for a series of
actions that would be widely viewed as criminal if conducted by
individuals have increasingly revolved around questions of
culpability and punishment, questions that have a long history in
the legal treatment of individual wrongdoing by people. In the
context of dealing with issues of accountability for conduct,
treating entities as having people-like features leads to a concern
about when people will feel it is appropriate to punish such
collective entities and whether their collective nature will change
the way that people think about responsibility for conduct. This
analysis will address this question by comparing the factors
shaping punishment for unethical conduct linked to people and to
groups. In particular, we will compare the reactions for unethical
conduct by individuals and by organizations.
This Article will address the question of whether or not
individuals responsible for assigning the punishment for the
wrongdoing react differently to evidence of unethical conduct
when it is committed by an individual or by an organization. We
suggest, based on findings in the psychology of punishment and on
human observations of both social behaviors and wrongdoing, that
perceptions and punishments of misconduct committed by
organizations are inherently deficient when compared to the
perceptions and punishments of similar misconduct perpetrated by
an individual. The human framework for understanding
wrongdoing is tailored to evaluate the behavior of individuals,
within which one can easily attribute intentions, desires, and
evaluations of character. Organizations are a more difficult target
for moral judgments because they lack these easily ascertainable
human aspects. To support this reasoning, we report four studies
conducted in a variety of social settings that examine how
individuals make judgments about the (mis)conduct of individuals
versus organizations.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT
The notion that the violation of a social rule deserves a
punishment is fundamental to any established society. While
societies differ widely in what rules they enact and how they
punish those who transgress those rules, the need to punish rule
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breaking is central to the maintenance of social order and is found
in all societies.6 One reason that explains the astonishingly
pervasive tradition of punishment across societies is that
punishment is evolutionarily adaptive. Indeed, it is argued that
punishment can serve as a learning instrument through which
societies not only prevent negative behaviors from reoccurring
(specific deterrence) but can also promote rule following behavior
(general deterrence). It is worth noting, however, that, at least until
recently, this mechanism for regulating society has evolved in a
social environment comprised of individuals and not organizations.
In other words, if in the course of our social evolution we
developed the means to deal with deviant behavior by individuals
through law and legal punishment, these means were developed to
perceive and to punish the misconduct of individuals and not of
groups, simply because social organizations have only recently
been defined and protected as codified legal entities in our social
environment.
At the individual level, studies exploring the nature of the
motivation to punish often link punishment to issues of retribution
and deterrence. According to retributive justice theory, punishment
addresses the moral outrage that people feel when they encounter a
wrongful act. From that perspective, the punishment should be
proportionate to the seriousness of the crime. The seriousness of
the act is determined by the magnitude of the harm and by the
circumstances that led the wrongdoer to cause such harm.7
According to this model, the key issue is the character of the
wrongdoer and his intentions when breaking a rule.8
In contrast, deterrence theory is built on a rational choice
6

Neil Vidmar & Dale T. Miller, Socialpsychological Processes Underlying
Attitudes Toward Legal Punishment, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 565, 565–602
(1980).
7
See Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do
We Punish?: Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. OF
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 284–99 (2002); Kevin M. Carlsmith &
John M. Darley, Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice, 40 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 193, 193–236 (M. P. Zanna ed., 2008); John M.
Darley & Thane S. Pittman, The Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive
Justice, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 324, 324–36 (2003).
8
Darley & Pittman, supra note 71, at 326.
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model and argues that the main purpose of punishment is
prospective—to prevent future wrongdoing.9 From a deterrence
perspective, the key goal of punishment is to shape the future
behavior of the wrongdoer (specific deterrence), as well as others
who might see their action and the subsequent punishment (general
deterrence).10
Studies on the motivations underlying punishment decisions
consistently show the social and the legal importance of both
deterrence and retribution as bases for punishment. They also show
that individuals cite both as important considerations when
punishing. Notwithstanding such evidence, individuals, in fact,
make punishment decisions primarily as a function of retributive
justice.11
The judgment of the moral seriousness of misconduct, one that
is of crucial importance to retributive justice concerns, relies
heavily upon assessments of the wrongdoer’s character and intent.
In other words, the same act that caused identical harm will carry
different moral labels if the act was done intentionally or
unintentionally. Some studies in the psychology of justice point out
that intention is so integral to moral judgments that assessments of
intent precede the evaluation of other features of the act. In other
words, individuals first make judgments about what the actor was
trying to do, and only after, continue in their moral appraisal of
other aspects of the harm and of the wrongdoer.12
Unfortunately, we do not possess access to others’ mental
states or to the intentions that underlie their actions. Judgments
about intent require a theory of mind, and more specifically, they
require psychological schemas and processes through which
people reason about others’ behavior. And, in particular, they
require a model for inferring the moral character of another person
9

See generally Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence at the Onset of the
Twenty-First Century, in 23 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1
(Michael Tonry ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1998).
10
See generally id.
11
See supra note 7.
12
See KELLY G. SHAVER, THE ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME: CAUSALITY,
RESPONSIBILITY, AND BLAMEWORTHINESS 166–67 (1985); BERNARD WEINER,
JUDGMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY: A FOUNDATION FOR A THEORY OF SOCIAL
CONDUCT 7–8 (1995).
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based upon information about how they have behaved in a given
set of circumstances. In the next section, we will focus on
psychological models and studies that explore the conceptual
framework through which people understand social behaviors, and
in particular, wrongdoings. As we will show, such understanding
relies heavily on attribution processes of intent and character that
work well when assessing individuals, but not as effectively for
organizations.
III. ASSESSING WRONGDOING BY INDIVIDUALS
The classic account of individuals’ perceptions of misconduct
is provided by the social psychologist Fritz Heider.13 Heider claims
that humans perceive others through a conceptual framework that
connects the behaviors and actions they observe with the
underlying mental states they infer the individual is experiencing.14
These inferences about the wrongdoer’s intent, motivations, and
desire are central to reactions to wrongdoings, and are achieved
through judgments of the perpetrator’s actions and character.15
According to Heider, the understanding of intentional actions is
defined in terms of the mental concepts of belief, desire, and
intention.16 In the context of wrongdoing, this account suggests
that perceptions of an act as wrongful are psychologically
connected to assessments of the moral character of the actor.17
Heider suggests that individuals approach others with the goal of
gathering the information they need to predict the conduct of
others not only in that moment but also in the future.18 Because
individuals believe that traits are immutable determinants of
behavior, knowing someone’s character is a sure way to predict the
nature of his or her future actions.19
Heider demonstrated the centrality of character assessments to
13

See generally FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY
RELATIONS (1958).
14
See HEIDER, supra note 13, at 20–58.
15
See id. at 79–124.
16
See generally HEIDER, supra note 13.
17
See generally id.
18
See generally id.
19
See generally id.
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punishment when he formulated a five-level model that shows the
connection between causing a crime and being punished for it.20 At
level four of his model, which he calls purposive commission,
people are held responsible for events that they intend to cause.21
Unsurprisingly, this level encapsulates the central dimension of
legal reasoning.22 At level five, the most sophisticated level of the
model, however, Heider articulates that a person’s punishment
depends not only upon what they intend but also upon situational
factors.23 For example, a person would be deemed less responsible
for the wrongful act if a person’s family were held hostage and he
or she is compelled by the hostage taker to rob a bank in order to
secure the family’s release.
In stages one through three of the model, Heider argues that
individuals often infer responsibility on lesser grounds, i.e., in spite
of a lack of intent.24 The most legally relevant example of this
deduction is careless commission, or when people are held
responsible for outcomes that they should have anticipated would
occur due to their actions. So, if a person were to leave the keys in
his or her car and a teenager steals the car and crashes into another,
the person might be held responsible because he or she should
have anticipated that such a consequence might occur. Drinking
and driving is another example of careless commission because a
drunken driver does not necessarily intend to cause harm, but is
often viewed as responsible for his or her diminished capacity to
act competently. While Heider’s model is complex, its meaning
and relevance for this discussion are simple—individuals view
inferences about both character and intent as central to holding
someone responsible for his or her actions and for punishing the
wrongdoing.25
In other words, when trying to understand others’ behavior,
individuals rely heavily on personality-based attributions and the
perception process through which people try to distinguish the
20
21
22
23
24
25

See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
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personality component of behavior from those aspects of behavior
caused by the situation. Heider also suggests that people do not do
this with complete accuracy. Instead they under weigh the forces
of the situation. This phenomenon is called the “fundamental
attribution error”—the tendency when judging the actions of a
person to put too little weight upon the role of the situation relative
to the weight that the situation actually has in causing the behavior.
The fundamental attribution error is shown to exist across a variety
of societies in numerous situations.
With regard to misconduct and according to the fundamental
attribution error, individuals are more likely to believe that bad
acts are committed by bad people rather than bad actions are the
result of bad situations. Such inferences indicate that when it
comes to forming judgments of others, individuals are easily
convinced that behavior is a reflection of the target’s character and,
as a consequence, that the target is then worthy of either praise or
blame.
IV. ASSESSING WRONGDOING BY ENTITIES
The Heiderian model of social perception works well for
individuals, but may not be sufficient to account for perceptions of
groups or organizations. In the case of collective entities,
individuals cannot use the traditional model of person perception
that entails: first, inferring character and through that inference,
then, forming assessments of blame, and finally, punishing
wrongful actions. Without the ability to evaluate individual
dispositions, in other words, people may have difficulty reacting to
wrongdoing.
Hans addresses the issue of responsibility directly in an
analysis of corporate wrongdoing.26 The focus of her work is on
judgments of wrongdoing made by observers, particularly jurors,
and she questions whether jurors differentially assess the
accountability of business corporations and individual plaintiffs.27
Her analysis of juries suggests that juror views of corporations

26
27

See generally HANS, supra note 4.
Id. at 82.
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were “less concrete” than their views of individual plaintiffs.28
Specifically, corporations (as non-people) cannot testify in court,
and in her study were instead represented by managers of varying
levels of seniority.29 Hence, jurors “had little basis on which to
generate detailed evaluations and inferences about their behavior
and character, which were so obvious in jurors’ assessments of the
plaintiffs.”30 Hans also cites psychological research that indicates
that individuals view people in fundamentally different ways than
groups.31 In discussing the psychological tendency to form global
judgments when considering individuals but not when considering
collective entities, she notes:
We expect that an individual will have a stable personality,
and as we listen to him or her speak we work to form an
integrated, global judgment about what that person is like.
In contrast, most of us do not expect that individuals who
are part of a group (such as a business corporation) are
going to behave in consistent ways, and therefore we are
less motivated to form a global impression of a group.32
Finally, Hans suggests that jurors try to find appropriate human
analogies when addressing questions of corporate responsibility for
wrongdoing.33 Jurors, she argues, find it helpful to think of
corporations as people.34 After her careful review of the relevant
evidence, Hans suggests that jurors often hold corporations to a
higher standard than individual plaintiffs by judging the
corporations to be more negligent than individual persons when
presented with the same set of facts.35 In summarizing her
conclusion, Hans states: “[A]lthough the actions of a person and a
corporation are evaluated using much the same criteria, more is
expected of a reasonable corporation than a reasonable person.”36
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 84.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id. at 84–85.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 82.
See id. at 114.
NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 278

212

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Ultimately, these elevated expectations, she argues, translate into
greater liability for corporations.37
Hans’ conclusions would appear to contradict the proposed
thesis of this Article, whose claim is that a lack of personified
elements in organizations makes them more difficult targets for
moral judgments. It is worth noting, however, that even Hans’
account describes the difficulty faced by jurors attempting to draw
inferences about the intentions and motivations underlying
organizational behavior.
This Article suggests that when the focus is upon crimes in
which moral turpitude is more central, such as lying and stealing,
and for which issues of character and intention are especially
central, people may look at individual versus corporate culpability
differently than they did with the cases studied by Hans.
V. PERSONALIZING RESPONSIBILITY
Within an alternative framework more relevant to crimes of
serious moral wrongdoing, Darley discusses the motivations
underlying assessments of wrongdoing by entities.38 He does so in
an analysis of social organization “and the production of evil.”39
Darley suggests that everyday thinking about evil requires a link
between it and elements of intent such that those who commit evil
acts are perceived as necessarily and intrinsically possessing the
quality of evilness in their character.40
The Darley argument suggests that people have trouble
accepting that situational factors can promote actions that might be
classified as evil.41 For example, in the famous Milgram study,
participants delivered lethal levels of electric shock to another
person.42 According to Darley, it is more difficult for people to
(2007).
37

See HANS, supra note 4, at 112–37.
See John M. Darley, Social Organization for the Production of Evil, 3
PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 199, 204–06, 211 (1992) [hereinafter Darley, Social
Organization].
39
See id. at 204.
40
See id. at 200–01.
41
See id. at 207, 217.
42
See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1975)
38
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conceive of situational forces as being “evil” than to believe that a
person possesses an inherently evil character.43 Hence, they made
character inferences about the person delivering harm and
underemphasized the role of the situation in creating the behavior.
Similarly, Arendt pinpoints the difficulty of labeling
organizational forces as the true root cause of evil when
articulating her great disappointment at the recognition that Adolf
Eichman was not a “monster,” but instead, an ordinary person
caught up in evil bureaucratic forces.44 Eichman, in Arendt’s
amended view, was so focused on efficiency in performing his job
that he could execute it without much consideration of the
consequences resulting from its fulfillment—there was limited
reflection upon whether his job involved shipping people to their
deaths or shipping some other commodity to a market.45
Arendt’s framing of someone widely viewed as a mass
murderer as instead a mindless bureaucrat makes it more difficult
to understand how to punish Eichmann’s wrongdoing because our
notion of serious immorality requires us to have a seriously
immoral (i.e., evil) actor to hold responsible and punish for their
actions.46 Relatedly, Kelman and Hamilton discuss the need for an
evil actor in order to identify evil when analyzing the My Lai
massacre of civilians by US troops in Vietnam.47 Condemning this
evil action required identifying an evil actor.48 And so, Lieutenant
Calley, the on-site commander was held responsible for the
massacre,49 even though the evil actions at My Lai arguably could
be viewed as resulting from situational forces such as the more
remote and less clearly specified high authorities for whom he
(explaining the findings of Milgram’s experiment that individuals are willing to
obey authority despite their own personal discomfort performing the assigned
task).
43
See Darley, Social Organization, supra note 38, at 203–04.
44
HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE
BANALITY OF EVIL 18 (1963).
45
Id. at 22.
46
Id. at 120–22.
47
See generally HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF
OBEDIENCE (1989).
48
See generally id.
49
See generally id.
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worked. From these examples, we come to see that evil actions
require a bad actor to be easily identified and punished for his/her
evilness.
VI. PERSONALIZING RESPONSIBILITY
Why might responsibility be allocated differently between
individuals and organizations? Psychology research argues that
individuals are motivated to personalize responsibility by finding
an individual to hold singularly accountable for complex events.
After events like Pearl Harbor or the September 11 attack on the
United States, commissions formed and investigations ensued that
were motivated by the need to assign responsibility for the harm.
Research suggests that people are especially motivated to assign
responsibility to either an irresponsible, negligent, or evil person.
This is likely because blaming a person is more psychologically
fulfilling than blaming an impersonal set of organizational or
situational forces. Identifying a person whose actions (or inaction)
led to the disaster brings psychological satisfaction. We do not
need to experience a major societal disaster for such motivations to
be activated, however. Heider argues that lower impact events like
a crime wave in a community motivate people to cast a broad net
in their efforts to identify someone to hold accountable for the
crimes.50 This can be reflected in community actions such as
punishing suspected wrongdoers via mob action, with only the
most tenuous link between the suspect and the crimes. When there
is a serious crime people “require” a culprit in the sense that they
are uneasy unless they can feel that the person responsible has
been found and punished.
Feigenson advances the idea of personalization when he
discusses motivations for holding people responsible in the context
of accidents.51 He suggests that: “When people use their common
sense to think about responsibility for accidents, they tend to think

50

See FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOL. OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 81–82

(1958).
51

NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL
ACCIDENTS 89 (2000).

BLAME:

HOW JURORS THINK & TALK ABOUT

Punishing Collective Entities

215

in simplified, personalized, moralized, and dichotomized terms.”52
According to Feigenson, individuals are motivated to focus on the
characteristics of the person responsible for the accident and to
“understand accidents in terms of personality-driven
melodramas.”53 He further suggests that blaming people simplifies
the assignment of responsibility and diverts attention from more
complex social and systemic causes of accidents.54 Ultimately, he
concludes: “Melodramatic blaming supports a culture of
individualism.55 It offers us a world in which human agency is
responsible for bad outcomes, and in which responsibility for those
outcomes is assigned to the people (the bad guys) who deviate
from accepted behavioral norms.”56
Several psychological studies, some of which were presented
in the symposium leading to this volume, show that the flexibility
of human perception allows us, under certain conditions, to view
groups and organizations in unified terms, and to attribute
intentions, drives, goals, and even traits to them. Thus, we are
capable of personifying groups, especially when we assess
cohesive and homogenous groups. This Article in particular argues
that this capacity to personalize is inherently more limited when it
comes to groups versus individuals—we simply are better at
assessing character and intentions when evaluating people than
organizations. We focus on the psychological reasons that people
blame people and organizations differently when reacting to
similar types and levels of conduct.
VII. SUMMARY OF EXISTING LITERATURE
The prior literature suggests that assigning responsibility to a
person comes more naturally than assessing the accountability of
collective entities. Consequently, individuals are inclined to
personalize complex problems to facilitate the formation of moral
judgments. This phenomenon is further supported by the tendency
52
53
54
55
56

Id.
See FEIGENSON, supra note 51, at 88, 212–13.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 213–14.
See generally FEIGENSON, supra note 51.
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of jurors to use personified analogies for corporations when
reasoning about the moral accountability of such collective
entities.
In addition, people may hold different standards for judging the
conduct of corporations. Hans provides the most direct evidence of
this by arguing that individuals hold corporations to higher
standards because they believe corporations to be more competent
and knowledgeable “people” that should be more responsible in
their conduct.57
Our goal is to examine the question of how people think about
responsibility when considering people and groups. In particular,
we will examine whether inferences about motive and character
are more central to evaluations of people than entities. And, we
will investigate whether this tendency leads to a weakening of the
attributed link between conduct and responsibility.
In addition, our focus is on the evaluations made by individuals
who are internal to the organization. Hans, as discussed above,
considered juror evaluations of companies. But, this set of
judgments necessarily reflects the assessments of outsiders. The
views of insiders are also important. Insiders are those who might
potentially call attention to wrongful conduct by whistleblowing or
by working internally to stop unethical practices. Furthermore,
they are important to corporate culture and can send a message to
the company by resisting, undermining, or ignoring practices they
view as unethical. For these reasons, we will focus on the
judgments made by those within an entity, in this case, a business
corporation.
VIII. ACCEPTING DECISIONS MADE BY PEOPLE OR INSTITUTIONS
The core of our argument is that people react differently to
similar conduct by individuals versus groups and organizations.
We will first consider this issue using a sample of employees
drawn from a corporation. The issue we will consider is: Why do
employees accept directives given to them within a work setting?
Those directives can come either from a person or from an entity.
This study is concerned with employee judgments of conduct
57

HANS, supra note 4, at 112–38.

Punishing Collective Entities

217

within their own company, and not with outsider evaluations of the
company. We focus on this issue because many elements of
wrongful conduct involve the acceptance of directives that could
potentially be questioned by employees. If employees raise
questions about or even disregard policies because they view them
as inappropriate or immoral this can be an important check on
questionable conduct by their work organizations.
The first study we conducted is based upon interviews with
employees at a large multinational financial services company.
Employees within the private banking division of this company
received a questionnaire via interoffice mail that assessed various
aspects of their organizational attitudes and behaviors.58 The study
focused on two possible employee reactions to managerial
practices: an unwillingness to defer to an individual and an
unwillingness to defer to a group. Individuals make decisions,
while entities make policies. When people have concerns about
either, however, they can express an unwillingness to accept them,
and this Article is concerned with their reasons for doing so. In
particular, our concern is with an employee’s lack of feelings of
obligation and responsibility to defer that may be the result of
employee concerns about practices occurring in their workplace.
The underlying assumption in both cases is that people typically
feel some responsibility to accept decisions from superiors and to
follow organizational policies. But they may express an
unwillingness to defer under conditions in which those policies
seem wrong.
We are interested in the different reasons people have for
refusing to defer to a person or to an entity.59 In particular, we
58

Surveys were sent to 1,350 bankers. They were returned directly to the
authors of this Article in enclosed business reply envelopes. Employees were
permitted to complete the survey while at work and were assured confidentiality
by both the investigators and the organization’s management. A total of 540
surveys were returned, representing a 40% response rate.
59
To measure deference in the case of supervisors, employees were asked
to agree or disagree with the following statement: “[a]n employee should accept
the decisions made by their supervisor, even if they think they are wrong;”
“[d]isobeying one’s supervisor is seldom justified;” “[s]omeone who disregards
their supervisor’s decisions hurts their work group;” and “[w]ork organizations
are most effective when people follow the directives of their supervisors.” For
the company, the questions were: “[r]espect for an organization’s rules is an
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argue that inferences about motivations should matter more with a
person than with an entity. In line with the arguments already
made, making motive inferences and judgments of character is a
person-level issue, and we think that it is easier to engage in this
assessment with a person than with an organization.
We will contrast three sets of judgments about the properties of
a person and of an organization. The attributes that might be
important for either are: neutrality,60 quality of treatment,61 and
inferences about motivations/character.62 To examine the link

important value for employees to have;” “[i]n the long run, the organization is
better off if workers willing[ly] follow the rules;” “[i]t is difficult to break the
rules often and keep one’s self respect;” and “[p]eople should support the
policies of their work organizations.”
60
The items measuring supervisor quality of decision making were: “[m]y
supervisor’s decisions are consistent across people and situations;” “[m]y
supervisor’s decisions are made based upon facts, not their personal biases and
opinions;” and “[m]y supervisor’s decisions are equally fair to everyone.” The
items measuring company decision making were: “The rules call for equal
treatment of all employees;” “[t]he rules dictate that decisions should be fair and
unbiased;” “[t]he rules and procedures are applied consistently across people
and situations;” “[t]he rules ensure that decisions are made based upon facts, not
personal biases and opinions;” and “[t]he rules and procedures are equally fair to
everyone.”
61
The items measuring supervisor quality of treatment were: “[m]y
supervisor respects my rights as an employee;” “[m]y supervisor respects my
rights as a person;” “[m]y supervisor treats me with dignity;” and [m]y
supervisor treats me with respect.” The items measuring company quality of
treatment were: “[t]he rules respect my rights as an employee;” “[t]he rules
respect my rights as a person;” “I am treated with dignity by my company;” and
“I am treated politely by my company.”
62
The items measuring supervisor character were: “[m]y supervisor
follows through on the promises he/she makes;” “[m]y supervisor usually gives
me an honest explanation for the decisions he/she makes;” and “[m]y supervisor
takes my needs into account when making decisions;” “I trust my supervisor to
do what is best for me;” and “[m]y supervisor listens to me when I express my
views.” The items measuring companies “character” were: “[t]he rules require
that I get an honest explanation for how decisions are made;” “[t]he company
follows through on the promises it makes;” “[m]y views are considered when
the rules are being applied;” “[t]he rules ensure that my needs will be taken into
account;” and “I trust the company to do what is best for me.” See Tom R. Tyler
& Avital Mentovich, Multinational Financial Services Employee Survey (July
2010, study on file with authors).
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between reasons for action and the legitimacy of
supervisors/organizations we looked at the role of decision
making, quality of treatment, and character inferences upon
legitimacy.63
An examination of the reasons that corporate employees have
for granting or withholding legitimacy to their supervisor and their
company supports our suggestion that people focus most strongly
upon character inferences when they are dealing with particular
people. As Table 1 shows, employees consider inferences about
the motivations of their supervisor, but not about the motivations
of management, when they are making legitimacy judgments. In
the case of the individual supervisor, inferences about the
supervisor’s motivations were the key factor shaping judgments
about legitimacy, while for the organization it was the neutrality of
the decision-making rules.
Table 1. The antecedents of employee willingness to defer.
Legitimacy
of policies

Legitimacy
of supervisor

0.26***

-.16

Quality of interpersonal treatment of
employees

-.08

-.06

Inferences about motivations behind
decisions

0.03

0.32**

Adjusted R.-sq.

8%

5%

Neutrality of decision making

Of course, legitimacy is not directly on point for this Article
because it is not about punishment. It is about accountability,
however, since legitimacy is measured in terms of an obligation to
defer. So, if people feel responsible for following directives, they
63

Legitimacy refers to the belief among employees that they ought to
accept and defer to the decisions of organizational authorities because it is
appropriate for those leaders to make decisions concerning what employees and
the company should do.
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will not object to or otherwise undermine the authority,
irrespective of whether that authority is a person or an institution.
A. Research on Employee Reactions to Wrongdoing in a
Sample of Employees
As noted above, the first study does not directly examine
punishment. The second study focuses on employees, which allows
for a more direct measure of punishment. The second study
examines the behavior of employees reacting to the actions of their
supervisors and corporate entities.64 Our particular concern is with
differences in reactions to the same ethically related judgments
about people (supervisors) versus corporate entities. Two
employee reactions are considered: a willingness to defer and
behavior to undermine/punish authorities.
B. Questionnaire
Employees were asked to evaluate two entities: “your
supervisor” and “your company and its formal rules and
procedures.” Identical questions were used to evaluate the ethical
character of the conduct of each employee’s supervisor and their
work organization. Ethical character included motive inferences,
but also asked about the ethicality of behavior and the provision of
opportunities for correction. Three questions were used to assess
64

Participants in the second study are a random sample drawn from a
national panel of respondents designed to be representative of the entire United
States population. Members of this national panel, which is maintained by a forprofit private organization, are initially contacted for their participation via
random digit dialing. An incentive of free Internet access via WebTV is
provided to all those that join the panel, and all surveys administered to the
panel are conducted over WebTV (for more details on the panel, please contact
the authors).
All potential respondents for the current study were screened to ensure that
they worked at least 20 hours a week, had a primary supervisor, and had worked
at their current employer for at least 3 months. Respondents meeting these
criteria completed the survey in two parts, one week apart. In total, there were
4,430 employee respondents in the sample.
This is data that was collected by and is on file with the authors.
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three aspects of ethical conduct: ethicality, trustworthiness, and
correctability. To assess ethicality, employees were asked whether
the conduct is “consistent with your views regarding appropriate
ethical standards.” To evaluate trustworthiness employees were
asked whether the conduct “reflect[s] a desire to do what is best for
employees like yourself.” And, to assess correctability, employees
are asked whether the authority “[p]rovide[s] you opportunities to
appeal decisions that you disagree with.” Employees responded to
each question on a five point scale, with “1” indicating strongly
disagree and “5” indicating strongly agree. Distinct scales were
created for supervisor (alpha = 0.87) and company (alpha = 0.89).
C. Findings
An examination of the average level of ethical conduct for
supervisors and companies suggests that employees see
supervisors as being more ethical than the company. The average
for employees’ supervisors was 3.25 (standard deviation = 1.05)
while the average for companies was 3.21 (1.09), which is a
significant difference (t(4430) = 2.96, p < .01). Both averages are
somewhat positive on a 1–5 scale with 2.5 as the midpoint.
D. Do these differences matter?
The key issue is whether it matters if the ethicality involves a
person or an entity. To address this question, we examined the
influence of ethicality upon behavior. Two behaviors were of
concern. The first involved actions taken against the company
and/or one’s supervisor, actions that we will refer to as “punishing
behavior.”65 Conversely, we were concerned with an employee’s
65

Employees were asked to assess the overall level of punishing behavior
they directed at their supervisor and company as a group, using questions with a
response scale ranging from 1 “never” to 7 “always.” The question was: “[h]ow
often do you . . . not do your best work because you are angry at your supervisor
or the organization you work for.” The mean was 1.80 (1.29) on a scale ranging
from 1 “never” to 7 “always,” which means employees rarely engaged in
punishing behavior.
Punishing one’s supervisor was measured by the frequency of engaging in
two types of behavior. Respondents were asked how often they: “[f]ind ways to
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willingness to follow directives, i.e., acceptance.66
A further examination considered the influence of ethics upon
compliance with company rules and the decisions of supervisors.
The question is whether ethical conduct helps. This analysis is
shown in Table 2. Again, ethical evaluations were more influential
in shaping the reactions of employees to their supervisor than to
their company. In this case the beta weight for the company is 0.12
and for supervisors is 0.22. In other words, employees put almost
twice as much weight upon character when deciding whether to
defer to individual decisions.
What about impact upon conduct, i.e., does unethical conduct
hurt either a person or an entity? First, what about behavior
designed to punish either one’s supervisor or the company? We
examined the influence of judgments about ethical conduct on
punishing behavior. The results of an analysis focused upon
punishment are shown in Table 3.
In the case of general punishment reactions, both evaluations of
the supervisor and the company have an influence of
undermine your supervisor?” and “[n]eglect to follow work rules or the
instructions of your supervisor?” These items were used to create a scale (mean
= 1.65; 0.93: alpha = 0.58).
Punishing one’s company was measured by frequency of engaging in three
types of behavior. Respondents were asked how often they: “[t]ake supplies
from work without permission?;” “[c]ome in late to work without permission?;”
and “[s]lack off towards the end of the day?” The items were used to create a
scale (mean = 1.97; 0.99; alpha = 0.60).
66
Accepting company rules was measured using five items, each of which
measured how often employees complied with rules. The items were: “how
often do you” “[c]omply with organizational rules and regulations?;” “[u]se
company rules to guide what you do on the job?;” “[s]eek information about
appropriate company policies before acting?;” “[c]ome to work on time?;” and
“[f]ollow organizational rules about how you should spend your time?” The
scale had a mean of 5.85 (0.94).
Accepting the instructions of one’s supervisor was measured using four
items, each of which measured how often the employee did as instructed. The
items were: “how often do you” “[f]ollow the directives of your supervisor?;”
“[f]ollow the policies established by your supervisor?;” “[c]arefully carry out the
instructions of your supervisor?;” and “[a]dhere to the directives of your
supervisor?” The items ranged from 1 “never” to 7 “always.” The scale had a
mean of 6.19 (0.84). Id.
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approximately equal magnitude. However, when we look at
targeted behavior, differences emerge. Employees are found to
connect ethical judgments to punishing behavior more strongly
when they are focused upon a person, i.e., their supervisor, than
upon an entity, i.e., their company. In the case of the supervisor,
the beta weight reflecting the strength of the connection to
punishing behavior was -.22, while for the company it was -.09.
The numbers can be compared to each other, or to the strength of
the influence of incentives/sanctions and/or the degree of
monitoring. Either comparison suggests that ethics matter more in
the case of a supervisor.
Table 2. Judgments of ethicality and willingness to defer.
Follow company
rules and policies
Ethics of company conduct
Ethics of supervisor’s conduct
Incentives/sanctions
Monitoring
Adjusted R.-sq

Follow
supervisor’s
decisions

.12***
—
.01
.34***
13%***

—
.22***
.02
.30***
14%***

Table 3. Judgments of ethicality and undermining actions by
employees.

Ethics of company conduct
Ethics of supervisor’s
conduct
Degree of
incentives/sanctions
Probability of gain/loss
(monitoring)
Adjusted R.-sq

Hurt
both

Hurt
company

Hurt
supervisor

-.13***
-.14***

-.09***
—

—
-.22***

-.02

0.00

-.01

-.14*

-.14***

-.07***

6%***

3%***

5%
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So, although the impact of ethical conduct upon legitimacy
judgments is similar for both supervisors and one’s company,
ethical judgments shape people’s behavior toward the wrongdoer
differently depending upon whether it is a person or an entity.
Entities do not suffer as much from inferences of unethical conduct
and, conversely, do not benefit as much from inferences of ethical
conduct.
E. Extension to Another Realm of Authority: Policing and the
Police
Both of the employee studies show that people more strongly
link evaluations of conduct to motive inferences when they are
dealing with a person. We suggest this occurs because people’s
judgments about entities are less strongly based upon motive
inferences. A direct examination of the factors shaping ethical
judgments supports this perspective by showing that inferences
about motivations are more central to evaluations of people.
This latter point is key because it suggests that people link their
evaluations of people to the motive inferences we have already
discussed. As a consequence, it is easy to use such inferences to
shape blame and punishment. In the case of entities, people have a
model of ethics that does not fit well with issues of culpability and
punishment because it is less centrally focused upon people’s
motivation and character. Instead, in the case of employees, a key
antecedent of corporate lack of ethics lies in ignoring people’s
rights. While ignoring rights and failing to treat people with
dignity are harms, they fit less clearly into a traditional model of
culpability, blame, and punishment.
What about in the legal arena? Do we see the same pattern? To
test for this possibility we examined the results of a study of the
residents of New York City. The sample was asked to make
evaluations of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”). A
random sample of the residents of the city evaluated the police in
general. Within that sample, a smaller group with recent personal
experiences evaluated the police officer(s) with whom they had
dealt. The key question is what factors people consider when
evaluating the NYPD as an entity as opposed to evaluating
particular individuals in the NYPD. Put another way, how do
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institutional evaluations differ from personal evaluations?
The results, shown in Tables 4 and 5, provide strong support
for the distinction found in the study of employees. When residents
are reacting to the entity or institution of the NYPD they consider
neutrality and respect for people/rights as the primary factors
shaping their overall evaluations of those entities. In contrast,
when they are reacting to a police officer with whom they have
personally dealt, residents consider inferences about the motives of
that person more than any other factor. In other words, as we found
with employees, inferences about the police officer’s character and
motivations are central to the resident’s reaction when the person is
involved personally with a police officer.
Table 4. Factors shaping institution level willingness to defer
to the police.
Institutional trust

Neutrality of the
police
Respect for
people/rights
Motive inferences
Control over
decisions
Adj. R.-sq.

Legitimacy of the
police
force
.28***

Institutional trust in
the police

.16**

.27***

-.04
.06

.06
.09*

18%

45%

.32***

Table 5. Factors shaping personal level willingness to defer to
the police.

Neutrality of police officer
Respect for person/rights
Motive inferences
Control over decision
Adj. R.-sq.

Willing to
accept
decision
.18***
.06
.58***
.10*
70%

Complain to
get decisions
changed
-.24*
-.03
-.26*
.05
21%
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F. Direct Examination of the Question: How will a
Corporation and Individuals within a Corporation be
Judged for Identical Wrongdoings?

The studies described above provide strong evidence regarding
how people perceive and interpret ethical behavior in real life
settings. They do not, however, provide causal evidence to the
question at hand. It is possible, for example, that supervisor level
and company level judgments of the lack of ethicality or of
unfairness influence differently the personal outcomes of
employees. A supervisor’s unfairness can more directly impact an
employee’s working life, and therefore such unfairness is likely to
negatively impact an employee’s cooperation. Also the studies we
described here do not provide direct evidence to whether the
identity of the wrongdoer itself, i.e., identification as a person or a
corporation, affects the ethical interpretation of an identical action.
To address these concerns we conducted an experiment in
which we looked into people’s reaction to an identical description
of an act of wrongdoing that was conducted either by a person or a
company. Of course, we also acknowledge that in this experiment,
unlike in the surveys, the people doing the judging are outsiders.
This approach is more like the juror judgment approach used by
Hans.67
We claim that organizations are not a convenient target for
moral judgments. People are better at seeing individuals as moral
agents and therefore they are less sensitive to misconduct
committed by a corporation than misconduct committed by a
person. However the fact that moral principles apply less to
organizations than to people does not only mean punishing them
less. It can also mean that groups and organization will not be
given the same ethical treatment or the same rights, or more
generally not be as easily given the things associated with being a
person, irrespective of whether those things are good (rights) or
bad (responsibilities).
To test these hypotheses we looked at how people react to a
study that presents misconduct—a discriminatory behavior in
workforce—committed by either a supervisor or a corporation. We
67

See supra Part IV.
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also looked at how people react to the denial of protected rights—
in this case a deprivation of the right to speech—directed towards
either company employees or toward the company itself. We
measured how people perceive and react to such scenarios.
In the first study, the participants68 read a newspaper article
describing a company, or a supervisor that consistently refused to
hire women. The descriptions of the alleged discrimination as well
as other descriptions of the case were kept identical and we only
varied the identity of the wrongdoer as being either a corporation
or a supervisor. After reading the article, participants were asked
whether they agree or disagree with the claim that the company’s
or supervisor’s behavior was discriminatory, or that this behavior
was permissible (reversely coded) on a scale ranging from 1
“strongly agree” to 7 “strongly disagree.” Our results show that
participants viewed the same behavior as more discriminatory
when it was conducted by a supervisor (M=2.44, SD=0.94), rather
than by a company ((M=3.40, SD=1.34), t(33)=2.47 p<0.05). We
also asked participants how severe the punishment should be for
this misconduct on a scale ranging from 1 “not at all severe” to 7
“very severe.” The results showed that participants thought that the
punishment should be harsher for the same behavior when it was
conducted by a supervisor (M=3.44, SD=2.10) rather than by a
company (M=2.40, SD=1.06).69
In the second study, we gave participants a newspaper article to
read which contained an article about the city council preventing
the corporation or the corporation’s employees from protesting
against a new tax that was enacted on the corporation. We asked
participants how much they “agree or disagree” that the city should
be allowed to prevent the corporation/employees from protesting,
and that the right to protest should have been expanded to the
company/employees in this case. The questions were administrated
on a scale ranging from 1 “strongly agree” to 7 “strongly
68

The participants were people recruited on the NYU campus. They
included both students and other members of the University community. Each
was approached and asked to complete a brief scenario based study. See Tom R.
Tyler & Avital Mentovich, Survey on Misconduct by Either Supervisor or
Corporation (Summer 2010, study on file with authors).
69
This difference is marginally statistically significant at t(33)=1.82,
p=0.08.
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disagree.” The results showed that participants viewed the denial
of protest rights to the employees as a more negative outcome
(M=1.78, SD=1.00) than a similar denial to the company
((M=2.63, SD=1.58), t(32)=2.06, p<0.05).
The results of these studies demonstrate that people did not
hold companies as morally responsible for unethical conduct as
individuals, and conversely, they did not see them as equally
deserving of similar legal protection for their rights, in this case the
right to speak. The fact that people failed both to punish
organizations and to give them rights supports our initial thesis that
organizations are not perceived as full moral agents in the same
way that people extend this model to individuals.
These findings also show that people’s perception of moral
deservingness contradicts the pervasive legal doctrine, which
deems corporations as equally worthy of the protection of many
constitutional rights. Our findings suggest that people view
individuals as much more deserving of both credit and blame for
moral acts.
CONCLUSION
The topic of this symposium is quite broad. It is about the law
and morality of punishing collective entities. Our concern is with
one aspect of this broad question: how people conceptualize
responsibility and blame on the personal and organizational level.
And, our focus is on the people within an organization who deal
both with the organization and its policies and practices, and with
the authorities within that organization who make decisions and
implement policies.
Our results suggest that people think about responsibility
differently at the individual level and at the organizational level. In
particular, they focus predominantly upon issues of character when
evaluating and reacting to individuals. But, they react to more
abstract procedural issues when dealing with entities. This suggests
that people have trouble putting organizational conduct into the
person-focused models through which culpability and punishment
are typically evaluated.
Hans argues that people view corporations as more
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professional.70 These findings support that characterization in that
they suggest people focus more on abstract issues, such as the
neutrality of decision making, when evaluating entities. When
evaluating people, they focus more directly upon motive inferences
and character judgments.
What are the implications of these findings? Our results
suggest that people are more capable of judging the conduct of
individuals than organizations. Similarly, an identical
organizational policy (in our case, gender discrimination in hiring)
raised greater moral condemnation when it was executed by a
person (the supervisor) rather than by the company. Therefore, if
organizations personalized the policies and revealed the
individuals behind their decisions, people would be more inclined
and better able to morally evaluate such conduct. Since people are
better in judging the responsibility of individuals, organizations
interested in promoting accountability for conduct need to be more
transparent with respect to the people behind the decision making
and the policies in the organizations instead of presenting people,
insiders or outsiders, with abstract entities they cannot morally
evaluate.
While these findings suggest that it is easier to evaluate
responsibility for individuals, they also suggest that people are
willing to be more flexible and discretionary in their understanding
of the actions of individuals. Judging the motives of a person
allows them flexibility to depart from rules, and shape actions to
particular circumstances, as long as people believe that their
motivations for doing so are benevolent. In other words,
individuals have more flexibility to enact particularized solutions
to problems, since they are judged based upon their intentions.
Organizations are judged based upon the neutrality of their rules
and their recognition of rights. This suggests less flexibility for
them to change what they do in particular situations.
Hence, overall our findings suggest a tradeoff. On the one
hand, an individual’s actions can be more easily understood in
moral terms, so individuals are more likely to be judged morally
responsible for something that they do. On the other hand, because
individuals are judged in terms of character and intention they have
70

HANS, supra note 4, at 122.

230

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

greater freedom to depart from formal rules and policies, as long as
their intentions in so doing are viewed as benevolent.

